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INTRODUCTION

"In the United States, a child is abused or neglected every [thirty-six]
seconds."I The frequency of child abuse and neglect is even more unsettling
when it comes to rates of abuse and neglect that lead to child fatalities.2 In the
past few years, too many children in South Carolina fell victim to what can only
be described as heinous crimes.3 These instances include but are in no way
limited to-a thirteen-month-old dying as a result of chronic malnutrition and
dehydration, weighing only nine pounds at the time of her death;4 a four-year-old

1. Kimberly Day, The Fight Against Child Abuse: What it Would Take to Win, 45 THE
PROSECUTOR, no. 2, 2011, at 44, 44.
2.
Id. at 44-45.
3.
See infra notes 4-8.
4.

Homicide by Child Abuse Investigation, MIDLANDS CRIME STOPPERS (Sept. 13, 2013),

http://news.midlandscrimestoppers.com/2013/09/homicide-by-child-abuse-investigation.html.
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autistic boy dying as a result of blunt-force head trauma; and a three-year-old
girl dying after she suffered prolonged physical and sexual abuse. 6 These types
of situations, along with many others, are unfortunately common among children
in the United States, as well as children in South Carolina.
Because of the unique character of child abuse fatality cases, prosecuting
offenders under traditional murder laws proves difficult.9 To combat this
difficulty, several states-including South Carolinalo have implemented
special statutes, usually referred to as "homicide by child abuse" statutes.11
These special homicide statutes recognize the need for additional protection for
children and, thus, separate child homicides from adult homicides.12 Such
statutes have received considerable praise from legal scholars as being an
appropriate way to address child abuse fatalities.13

5.
Kelly Davis, Richland Parents Held in 4-Year Old Son's Death, THE STATE, July 4,
2013, at Bl, available at http://www.thestate.com/2013/07/03/2846294/richland-county-pairarrested.html.
6.
Patricia Burkett, Mom Testifies Against Former Boyfriend in Bennettsville Homicide by
Child Abuse Case, WBTW NEWS 13 (June 19, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.wbtw.com/story/
22634123/mother-testifies-against-former-boyfriend-wednesday-in-bennettsville-homicide-by-childabuse-case.
7.
Child Abuse & Neglect Deaths in America, EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND 6 (July
2012), http://www.everychildmatters.org/storage/documents/pdf/reports/can report august2012 fmal.pdf
("More than 25 million reports of abuse and neglect have been made to official state child
protection agencies in this past decade.")
8.
Several other recent incidents in South Carolina for which offenders were charged with
homicide by child abuse illustrate the prevalence of this crime in the state. See Davis, supra note 5;
R. Darren Price, Woman Arrested in Child's Death, THE STATE, May 23, 2013, at BI, available at
http://www.thestate.com/2013/05/23/2783477/columbia-woman-arrested-in-child.html; Funeral Set
for Toddler Allegedly Killed by Abuse, LIVE 5 WCSC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.live5news.com/story/15643399/mother-arrested-after-toddler-dies-burns-found-ingenital-area; Will Jones, Two Homicide by Child Abuse CasesHead to GrandJury, Fox CAROLINA
NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.foxcarolina.com/story/15194350/two-homicide-bychild-abuse-cases-head-t; Ray Rivera, Man Gets Life in Prison for Homicide by Child Abuse in
Son's Death, WISTV NEWS 10 (Oct. 11, 2012, 3:41 PM), http://www.wistv.com/story/
19795253/jury-finds-man-guilty-of-homicide-by-child-abuse-in-sons-death; Tony Santaella, Teen
Charged with Homicide by Child Abuse, WLTX.COM (Apr. 11, 2012, 2:34 PM), http://www.
wltx.com/news/story.aspx?storyid 183428.
9.
Jerold P. McMillen, Note, Prosecuting Child Abuse Homicides in Iowa: A Proposalfor
Change, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 129, 131 (1995).

10. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (2003).
11. See Ryan H. Rainey & Dyanne C. Greer, Criminal Charging Alternatives in Child
FatalityCases, 29 THE PROSECUTOR, no. 1, 1995, at 16, 16.
12. Bryan A. Liang & Wendy L. Macfarlane, Murder by Omission: Child Abuse and the
PassiveParent,36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 423 (1999).

13. See, e.g., McMillen, supra note 9, at 151 ("By adopting a homicide-by-abuse law, state
efforts to prosecute the offenders who violate a child's trust will not be hindered by laws
inadequately designed to punish the offender."); Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide:
A Statutory Proposal,89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 593 (1999) (stating that "child homicide
statutes can provide a useful tool in the fight against child abuse"); Rainey & Greer, supra note 11
(noting that states responded to the difficultly of proving the requisite intent to obtain murder
convictions by developing specialized child homicide statutes). Further, after two years of studying
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This Note discusses the current epidemic of child abuse and neglect fatalities
in the United States, and in South Carolina specifically, arguing that South
Carolina's homicide by child abuse statute is not as effective as originally
intended and that more can be done to protect the welfare of children in the state
from both a legal and policy standpoint. Reducing the state's child abuse fatality
rate is obviously important to South Carolina, as demonstrated by the General
Assembly's adoption of a separate homicide charge designed specifically to
address the issue. However, by reforming the current law to increase the
coverage of protection, creating stricter mandatory reporting rules, and focusing
on improving child protection services, South Carolina lawmakers could
accomplish more.
Part II of this Note provides general background information on fatal child
abuse, discusses the issues that accompany prosecuting such crimes, and
summarizes the possible legal alternatives in addressing the problem. Part III
sets forth the current law in South Carolina-mainly the homicide by child abuse
statute and the corresponding mandatory reporting statute. Part IV compares
South Carolina's law with the law in other states, particularly states that have
similar homicide by child abuse statutes, to determine whether the language or
structure of these statutes should be used to guide legal reform in South Carolina.
Part V explores possible changes to the current South Carolina statutes and
offers several policy recommendations to help South Carolina better combat the
problem of fatal child abuse.
II.

BACKGROUND

The reality that child abuse and neglect are common in the United States is
hard to accept.14 This Part discusses the prevalence of fatal child abuse, looking
first at the overall prevalence of fatal child abuse in the United States and then
looking specifically at fatal child abuse in South Carolina. Part II also sets forth
the issues that accompany prosecuting such crimes and explores the various
charges that may be brought against offenders.
A.

FatalChild Abuse in the United States

The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System defines childfatality as
"the death of a child caused by an injury resulting from abuse or neglect or
where abuse or neglect was a contributing factor."15 Fatalchild abuse may refer

child fatalities, the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect determined that the enactment
of child homicide statutes should be a national priority. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 70

(1995).
14.

See EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 6.

15. Child Abuse and Neglect Fatalities2011: Statistics and Interventions, CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY 2 (Feb. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality.pdf.
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to one of two situations: "repeated abuse over a period of time (e.g., battered
child syndrome)" or "a single, impulsive incident (e.g., drowning, suffocating, or
shaking a baby)." 1 6 Fatal neglect, on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which the child's death does not result from anything that the caregiver does, but
rather "from a caregiver's failure to act."' The neglect may be "chronic (e.g.,
extended malnourishment)" or may be "acute (e.g., an infant who drowns after
being left unsupervised in the bathtub)."18
Every year, thousands of children in the United States die as a result of
physical abuse, severe neglect, and other forms of maltreatment, 19 usually
committed by their parents or someone who is "entrusted with their care" and
responsible for their protection.20 In fact, "[t]he United States has one of the
worst records among the industrialized nations" 2-losing approximately five

16

Id. at 4.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Day, supra note 1, at 44. Between 2001 and 2010, the official number of child abuse
and neglect fatalities was 15,510. See EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 1
(citations omitted). This number is almost three times as large as the combined military deaths from
2001 to 2010. Id. at intro. (citations omitted). "[H]omicide is the cause of death among children
seven times more frequently than meningitis and twenty times more often than AIDS." Phipps,
supra note 13, at 541-42 (citing Carolyn J. Levitt et al., Abusive Head Trauma, in CHILD ABUSE:
MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT

1, 5 (Robert M. Reece ed.,

1994)).

While these

situations are, of course, contextually distinguishable, they also demonstrate that child abuse and
neglect fatalities are a prevalent and very serious cause of death in American society.
20. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-599,
CHILD MALTREATMENT:
STRENGTHENING NATIONAL DATA ON CHILD FATALITIES COULD AID IN PREVENTION 1 (2011),

available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl 1599.pdf; see also Phipps, supra note 13, at 542
("Those who kill young children are nearly always caretakers or persons in a significant relationship
to the child.").
21. National Child Abuse Statistics: Child Abuse in America, CHILD HELP,
http://www.childhelp-usa.com/pages/statistics (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (citing CHILDREN'S
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2012, at 51-60

(2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/research-data-technology/statisticsresearch/child-maltreatment; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20). According to
a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report comparing incidents of physical abuse of
children among the twenty-seven richest nations of the world, children in the United States, Mexico,
and Portugal have the greatest chances of dying from maltreatment. U.N. CHILDREN'S FUND, A
LEAGUE TABLE OF CHILD MALTREATMENT DEATHS IN RICH NATIONS: INNOCENTI REPORT CARD

No. 5, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/repcard5e.pdf. The
report found that a small group of countries-Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Norway have an
exceptionally low incidence of child maltreatment deaths. Id. Compared to those leading countries,
Belgium, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Hungary, and France have child death rates that are
four to six times higher. Id. The United States, Mexico, and Portugal have rates that are between
ten and fifteen times higher than the leading countries. Id. Additionally, the U.S. child
maltreatment death rate is three times higher than that of Canada, eleven times that of Italy, and
more than double that of France, Japan, Germany, and Britain. Naomi Spencer, Child Deathsfrom
Abuse and Neglect Rise in the US, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/10/chld-o28.html.
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children every day to abuse-related deaths. 22 Infants, children who are a year old
or younger, and toddlers, children who are three years old or younger, "are the
most vulnerable to such abuse and neglect"23 because of "their dependency,
small size, and inability to defend themselves." 24
States use different mechanisms to count and report child abuse, and states
also dissimilarly define what constitutes child abuse and neglect deaths.25 Thus,
the actual number of abused children in the United States-and the actual
number of child abuse and neglect fatalities-is unknown.26 Several researchers,
however, have found that a significant undercounting of child abuse and neglect
deaths has occurred and that the true number is several thousands more than the
fatalities found for the 2001 to 2010 range.27 Additionally, regardless of whether
an exact number of recorded fatalities is ascertainable, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services has reported an increase in the rates of child abuse
fatalities during the past several years.28

22. CHILD HELP, supra note 21 (citing CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 21, at 51-60; U.S.
GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1). The range of daily deaths is, on average,
somewhere between four and seven. Id. (citing CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 21, at 51-60; U.S.
GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1). Whatever the actual number may be, many
more American children die from abuse and neglect than children in the majority of other developed
countries. See EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 8 (citing U.N. CHILDREN'S

FUND, supra note 21, at 6).
23. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1, 4; see also Phipps, supra note
13, at 541 (citing Levitt et al., supra note 19, at 5) (finding that children under the age of five are at
the greatest risk for being killed by abuse or neglect).
24.

CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 15, at 4.

25. Day, supra note 1, at 46; see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 15, at 3
(noting the variation among reporting requirements and definitions of child abuse and neglect).
26. Day, supra note 1, at 46.
27. EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 1 (citing Marcia E. HermanGiddens et al., Underascertainmentof ChildAbuse Mortality in the United States, 282 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 463, 463-67 (1999); EDWARD E. COTTON, ADMINISTRATIVE CASE REVIEW PROJECT,
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA: REPORT OF DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/fileadmin/ncyl/youthlaw/litigation/Clark
K.2/Ed Cotton Report.pdf; Tessa L. Crume et al., Underascertainmentof Child Maltreatment
Fatalities by Death Certificates, 1990 1998, 110 PEDIATRICS e18 (2002), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/110/2/el8.full.html).
Congress has also found that
deaths from child abuse and neglect are significantly underreported. See Protect Our Kids Act of
2012, H.R. 6655, 112th Cong. § 2 (as passed by House of Representatives, Dec. 19, 2012).
28. EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 3. In response to the prevalence
of fatal child abuse in the United States, the House recently passed the Protect Our Kids Act of
2012, which is aimed at developing a national strategy, as well as recommendations for reducing
fatalities from child abuse and neglect. See H.R. 6655, 112th Cong.
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B. FatalChild Abuse in South Carolina
Under South Carolina law, child abuse or neglect means "an act or omission
by any person which causes harm to the child's physical health or welfare." 29
This harm occurs as follows:
[W]hen a person: (a) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child
physical injury, including injuries sustained as a result of excessive
corporal punishment; (b) fails to supply the child with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or health care, and the failure to do so causes a
physical injury or condition resulting in death; or (c) abandons the child
resulting in the child's death. 30
Recently, state legislators admitted that South Carolina is struggling to
31
protect children from being neglected or abused to death.
South Carolina has
frequently ranked higher than many other states when it comes to child abuse
and neglect fatalities.32 Indeed, South Carolina's rates of abuse fatalities for a

29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(B)(1) (2003).
30. Id. § 16-3-85(B)(2).
31. See, e.g., Kim Severson, South Carolina Soul-Searching on Welfare of Children, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2013, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/us/south-carolinasoul- searching-on-welfare-of-children.html? r=0 (quoting Representative Jenny Anderson Home as
saying, "We've had way too many dead children lately."). Further, some critics believe the high
rate of child fatalities is the result of a recurring, systemic failure to protect South Carolina's
vulnerable children. See Porter Barron, Jr., In Harm's Way: Critics Say DSS Fails to Protect State's
Most Vulnerable Children, FREE TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.free-times.com/cover/in-harmsway.
32. Between 1999 and 2012 the years that the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services released child maltreatment reports with specific data regarding child abuse and neglect
fatalities-South Carolina ranked higher than the national rate for six years, approximately the same
for two years, and lower for six years. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999, at 41 (2001), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm99/cm99.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, at 57 (2002), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cmOO/cm2000.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2001, at 54 (2003), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cmOl/cm0l.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, at 54 (2004), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm02/cm02.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2003, at 58 (2005), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm03/cm2003.pdf, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004, at 68 (2006), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cm04.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2005, at 65 (2007), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm05/cm05.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2006, at 70 (2008), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm06/cm06.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.,

CHILD MALTREATMENT

2007, at 59 (2009), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/

programs/cb/pubs/cm07/cm07.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
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majority of the years between 2000 and 2010 were higher than the national
average.3 3 Notably, South Carolina's rates do not indicate a trend toward
reducing fatal child abuse occurrences; 34 rather, the rates have fluctuated over
this period instead of steadily decreasing. 35 The fluctuations in South Carolina's
annual child abuse fatality rates suggest that rates will continue to rise and fall
sporadically, unless changes are made to law and policy. 36
C. Issues with ProsecutingFatal Child Abuse
When attempting to charge and convict offenders who abuse a child to
death, prosecutors have to overcome many hurdles.37 First, prosecutors must
tackle the emotional issue: no one wants to believe that caretakers-or, more
specifically, parents-can engage in such violence against children. 38 Thus,
prosecutors are tasked with the challenging job of successfully persuading jurors
that caretakers are capable of physically abusing children to such extremes. 39 A
major obstacle to such persuasion is establishing that the caretaker had the

SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2008, at 59 (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm08/cm08.pdf;

CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, at 59 (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf;

CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010, at 63 (2011), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cml0/cm10.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, at 63 (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/cb/cml l.pdf; CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2012, at 56 (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/
cm2012.pdf. In 2011 alone, fifteen children died as a result of abuse or neglect in South Carolina.
See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra, at 63. Alabama and Maryland, states that have child
populations similar to South Carolina, had fewer fatalities in 2011 -eleven and ten, respectively.
See id.
33. See sources cited supra note 32.
34. See sources cited supra note 32. The only noticeable pattern or lack thereof-is that
yearly rates rise and fall erratically. See id. Further, a state Department of Social Services deputy
director announced in August of 2013 that there had already been thirty-one child fatalities since
January 2013 an increase from previous years. See Porter Barron, Jr., As Child FatalitiesRise, So
Does Anger at DSS, FREE TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.free-times.com/news/100213-as-childfatalities-rise-so-does-anger-at-dss. For example, in 2012, twenty-three children died. See CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2012, supra note 32, at 56.
35. See sources cited supra note 32.
36. See sources cited supra note 32. Notably, a limitation to this research is that the data
came from years after the homicide by child abuse statute was adopted in 1992. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-85 (2003); sources cited supra note 32. Several sources, however, have indicated that
comprehensive child abuse and neglect fatality data is difficult to find. See, e.g., Day, supra note 1,
at 46; Phipps, supra note 13, at 540. Thus, while this Note cannot compare the rates from before
and after the enactment of the statute, the rates since the enactment still have not steadily decreased
between 1999 and 2012. See sources cited supra note 32.
37. Rainey & Greer, supra note 11, at 16.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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requisite mental state for criminal culpability. 40 Judges and juries are often
reluctant to accept that a caretaker acted with a particular mental state-for
instance, malice-toward a child; rather, they prefer to believe that the child's
death was a result of accidental behavior, not the caretaker's intent to kill or to
cause physical harm to the child.4 1 Accordingly, some jurors and udges will
"resist verdicts that place a high degree of culpability on a caretaker."
Traditional notions of parental rights and family preservation can also act as
barriers to establishing that a possible abuse fatality has occurred.43 Violence
between adults is not treated the same as violence between adults and children in
American society. 44 In particular, "if one adult assault[s] another, the crime [is]
investigated regardless of the relationship between the parties." 45 On the other
hand, "the same assault on a child is frequently dismissed as simple discipline." 46
This view of parental rights and family privacy is embedded in American
culture. 4 The importance of family autonomy and privacy is based on two
fundamental assumptions: (1) "that privacy strengthens families," and (2) "that
parents will act in the best interests of their children." 48 However, these two
assumptions are clearly not true in many situations, particularly in cases of child
maltreatment, abuse, and neglect. 49
Thus, the tension between familial
privacy including the autonomous right to raise children in the manner that one
desires-and a state's interest in zealously combating child abuse often makes
sensitive child abuse situations even harder to address. 0 Likewise, "[a]ttempts

40. Id.
41. Phipps, supra note 13, at 537.
42. Id. at 538.
43. Rainey & Greer,supra note 11.
44. See id.
45. Id. Domestic abuse situations prove to be an exception to this general rule, given the
United States' history of ignoring domestic violence and viewing it as a private matter. See, e.g.,
James Martin Truss, Comment, The Subjection of Women .. . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of
Protectionfor Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1149, 1150-56 (1995)
(citations omitted) (discussing the history of domestic violence in America and the judicial system's
reluctance to intrude into "family matters").
46. Rainey & Greer, supra note 11. While this view is particularly evident in circumstances
involving less serious physical abuse, it can also be present in circumstances involving serious
injury or death. Id.
47. See John G. McMullen, Privacy,FamilyAutonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ.
L. REV. 569, 572 (1992) (examining why American law and policy fiercely protects "privacy and
autonomy within the family").
48. Id. at 569.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Ariane De Vogue, Supreme Court to Weigh Child Abuse Against Family's
Privacy, ABC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/court-weigh-child-abuseprivacy/story?id=13015595 (describing a Supreme Court case that pits the privacy rights of students
and their families against the state's interest in aggressively combating child abuse in which the
issue was whether a child protection investigator should have obtained a warrant or parental consent
before removing a nine-year-old from class and interviewing her about alleged abuse in the home).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/6

8

Benincasa: Protecting Our Children: A Reformation of South Carolina's Homici
2014]

FAMILY LAW

743

to accommodate family autonomy and privacy interests" can "significantly
compromise[] the protection" of children.
Further, the sudden death of a child can hinder prompt and effective
52
investigations, which in turn delays the determination of whether the death
constitutes an abuse fatality.53 Authorities are often hesitant to intrude after a
child dies suddenly or unexpectedly because of the assumption that the family is
54
grieving. Thus, in many cases, the cause of death may originally be labeled as
"unknown or accidental" but later correctly identified as an intentional
homicide. 5 The initial assumption of an accidental death hampers a thorough
investigation because many pieces of evidence may be lost or destroyed and
56
potential witnesses may be unavailable once a correct determination occurs.
As a result, many child deaths are not routinely investigated or autopsied,
making it difficult to understand the magnitude of the problem.
D. PotentialCharges
Possibly the most problematic legal issue arises once a child abuse death
case is properly identified and authorities must decide the crime with which to
charge the offender.
An abuser may be charged and convicted of a lesser
offense than murder because the abuser is found to possess only the intent to
cause serious physical injury or the intent to abuse-not the intent to kill.59

51. McMullen, supra note 47, at 569.
52. See Rainey & Greer, supra note 11.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. McMillen, supra note 9, at 130; see, e.g., State v. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d 546, 552-53
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (detailing a case of a successful prosecution of a mother for second-degree
murder more than twenty years after the death of her adopted son in which, at the time of the boy's
death, the autopsy report listed the mode of death as "deferred," but the mode of death was later
changed to "homicide" after a different coroner examined the report and concluded that the boy had
been a victim of battered child syndrome). Additionally, a recent report on child abuse and neglect
fatalities in the United States "estimate[d] that approximately 50 percent of deaths reported as
unintentional injury deaths are reclassified after further investigation by medical and forensic
experts as deaths due to maltreatment." CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 15, at 3
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 4
5).
56. Rainey & Greer, supra note 11.
57. Child Abuse and Neglect, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2002), http://www.who.int/violence
injuryprevention/violence/world report/factsheets/en/childabusefacts.pdf.
58. See Rainey & Greer, supra note 11.
59. See McMillen, supra note 9, at 147-49 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2006);
Midgett v. State, 729 S.W.2d 410, 410-14 (Ark. 1987); Burnett v. State, 697 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Ark.
1985), overruled by Midgett, 729 S.W.2d 410); see also Phipps, supra note 13, at 553-54
(discussing how courts sometimes lower jury convictions of first-degree murder to a lesser offense
(quoting Midgett, 729 S.W.2d at 411, 413, 415-16)).
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Thus, the range of charges that can be brought against an abuser results in
differences in how states charge, convict, and penalize offenders. 60
One approach is to address the crime through a traditional first-degree
murder charge. 6 1 This approach is difficult, however, because first-degree
murder traditionally requires a "showing of willfulness, deliberation, and
premeditation."62 Defining and applying the concepts of premeditation and
deliberation is difficult in the context of child abuse fatalities63 because obtaining
"direct, subjective evidence of a caretaker's intent to injure or kill a child" is
64
arduous, if not impossible.
Fatal child abuse situations differ from killings
unrelated to child abuse in several respects: child abuse typically occurs secretly
in the privacy of one's home; the child victims are usually completely dependent
upon the abuser and unable to defend themselves; the child victims are often too
young to inform others of their situation or to ask for help;65 the death of the
child makes the child incapable of testifying against the abuser, the effects of
which are exacerbated if there are no other witnesses; and children often lack
obvious external injuries in abuse cases-unlike a gunshot or knife wound,
injuries resulting from child abuse require careful observation by a medical
examiner.66 Likewise, it can be difficult to convict under a second-degree
murder charge, "which traditionally requires a showing of killing with malice
As noted above, the factfinder may not want to believe that the
aforethought.
defendant acted with hatred or ill will toward the child and might not be
persuaded of the defendant's culpability.68 Instead, the judge or jury might find
that the death was a result of the uncontrollable frustration of coping with a
crying child.69

60. See Rainey & Greer, supra note 11; see also Phipps, supra note 13, at 586 (noting the
wide disparity of sentences that can be imposed for similar acts).
61. See, e.g., McMillen, supranote 9 (discussing the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of
an abuser's intent to kill when an abuser is charged with first-degree murder for child abuse
homicide (citing State v. Hughes, 457 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990))).
62
Id.
63. Phipps, supra note 13, at 552 (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

§ 7.7(a),

at 237 (1986)).

64. McMillen, supra note 9, at 131 & n.19 (citing LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 63, § 7.7(a),
at 237). Midgett v. State, 729 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987), provides an example of a failure to convict
an abuser under a traditional first-degree murder charge. In that case, although the defendant had
abused his son in an especially egregious manner, his charge was lowered from first-degree to
second-degree because no evidence showed that he acted with the requisite intent to kill. Id. at 411
(citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 41-1502(1)(b), 41-1503(1)(c) (1977)). Rather, the court concluded that
he, in fact, had the intent to keep the boy alive so that he could continue to abuse him. Id. at 414.
The case was timely overturned by an Arkansas statute that made knowingly causing the death of a
child fourteen years of age or younger first-degree murder "under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life." ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-102(a) (2006).
65. State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 27, 664 S.E.2d 480, 484-85 (2008) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
66. See Phipps, supra note 13, at 538.
67. McMillen, supra note 9.
68. See supra notes 38 -42 and accompanying text.
69. McMillen, supra note 9.
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Charging under traditional manslaughter laws is problematic as well.70 An
involuntary manslaughter charge which traditionally requires accidental or
unintentional action -is likely unwarranted in a child abuse fatality case
because the injuries that result from physical abuse can hardly be categorized as
accidental or unintentional.72 Likewise, a voluntary manslaughter charge
which traditionally requires provocation 73iS often unwarranted, especially in
jurisdictions that specifically find that a child's crying does not constitute
adequate provocation. Further, manslaughter convictions may result in a lower
75
punishment that seems unequal to the egregious nature of the crime.
Another possible approach is to address the crime through the felony murder
doctrine by "permit[ting] felony child abuse to act as the underlying felony that
triggers a felony-murder charge."76 However, some legislatures and courts
oppose this approach, viewing the scope of the felony murder doctrine narrowly
and limiting the underlying felonies to only those that are independent from the
homicide itself
which necessarily precludes child abuse. Under this view, the
felony murder approach is inappropriate because it "abuses the limited purpose
of the felony-murder rule and violates the defendant's right to due process.

70. See id. at 134-35 (citing State v. Taylor, 452 N.W.2d 605, 605-07 (Iowa 1990); State v.
Hughes, 457 N.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990)).
71. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 348 S.C. 526, 529, 560 S.E.2d 888, 889 (2002) (stating that
involuntary manslaughter involves, inter alia, "the unintentional killing of another without malice"
(citing State v. Chatman, 336 S.C. 149, 152, 519 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1999))).
72. McMillen, supra note 9, at 134-35 (citing Taylor, 452 N.W.2d at 605-07; Hughes, 457
N.W.2d at 27-28).
73. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 363 S.C. 111, 115, 609 S.E.2d 528, 530 (2005) ("Voluntary
manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in the sudden heat of passion upon sufficient
legal provocation." (quoting State v. Cooley, 342 S.C. 63, 67, 536 S.E.2d 666, 668 (2000)))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See McMillen, supra note 9, at 135 (citing Taylor, 452 N.W.2d at 605-07); see also
Phipps, supra note 13, at 561 ("Courts uniformly hold that a child's behavior cannot provoke a fatal
response from a reasonable person.").
75. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-50 (2003) ("A person convicted of
manslaughter . . . must be imprisoned not more than thirty years or less than two years."), with id.
§ 16-3-60 ("A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter must be imprisoned not more than
five years.").
76. See McMillen, supra note 9, at 132; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(h) (Supp.
2014) (enumerating fatal child abuse as one of the underlying felonies for felony murder charge).
77. See McMillen, supra note 9, at 132; see, e.g., People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 888 (Cal.
1984) (holding that felony child abuse cannot serve as the underlying felony to support a conviction
of second-degree murder on a felony murder theory because the merger doctrine bars a felony
murder charge when the underlying felony is an integral part of the homicide (citing People v.
Burton, 491 P.2d 793, at 801 (Cal. 1971))); see also Phipps, supra note 13, at 567 ("If the
underlying felony is not sufficiently distinct, it merges with felony murder and thus cannot act as
the underlying offense.").
78. McMillen, supra note 9, at 132.
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III. CURRENT SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

To overcome the difficulty of convicting under the above charges, some
states have developed specialized child homicide statutes that eliminate the
intent to kill requirement for situations in which a child's death results from
abuse.
Instead, a prosecutor must only show that the perpetrator physically
abused or neglected the victim and that the abuse or neglect was the cause of the
child's death. 0 Further, every state has laws requiring certain people-or all
people, depending on the expansiveness of the statute-to report concerns of
child abuse and neglect to the proper state authorities.81 This Part sets forth the
current South Carolina laws designed to address fatal child abuse.
A.

Homicide by ChildAbuse Statute

In 1992, "in light of the insidious nature" 82 of child abuse and neglect
fatalities, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted a new homicide
offense homicide by child abuse-codified in section 16-3-85 of the South
Carolina Code:
A person is guilty of homicide by child abuse if the person: (1) causes
the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child
abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting
an extreme indifference to human life; or (2) knowingly aids and abets
another person to commit child abuse or neglect, and the child abuse or
neglect results in the death of a child under the age of eleven. 83
Under South Carolina law, "Homicide by child abuse is a felony charge,"
and a person who is convicted of the crime or pleads guilty to the crime may be
imprisoned for a maximum of life in prison, but not less than a term of twenty
years.8 4 Further, a person who is convicted of aiding or abetting the crime "must
be imprisoned for a term not exceeding twenty years nor less than ten years."85
A judge must take into account any aggravating circumstances when sentencing
the defendant "including, but not limited to, a defendant's past pattern of child

79. Rainey & Greer,supra note 11.
80. Id.; see also Phipps, supra note 13, at 579 ("Homicide by abuse statutes contain three
basic elements: (1) the actor kills a child while engaged in child abuse; (2) the circumstances
manifest an extreme indifference to the value of human life; and (3) the victim is a child under a
specified age.").
81. See Mandated Reporting, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.
gov/responding/mandated.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
82. State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 27, 664 S.E.2d 480, 485 (2008) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A) (2003).
84. Id. § 16-3-85(C)(1).
85. Id. § 16-3-85(C)(2).
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abuse or neglect of a child under the age of eleven, and any mitigating
circumstances," excluding a child's crying.86
B. MandatoryReporting Requirements
South Carolina's persons required to report statute8 stipulates that certain
professionals are required to report: when, in serving in a professional capacity, a
person receives information giving the person reason to believe that a child has
been or may be abused or neglected, that person must report the potential abuse
or neglect.88 The statute also provides that other people who have "reason to
believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare has been or may be
adversely affected by abuse and neglect may report" their suspicion of the abuse
or neglect.89 Further, the statute provides that if "[a] person required to report a
case of child abuse or neglect . . . knowingly fails to do so," that person is "guilty

of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than [$500],
imprisoned not more than six months, or both." 90
The South Carolina Code also contains a statute abrogating privileged
communications and setting forth the exceptions to this abrogation. 91 This
statute provides that "[t]he privileged quality of communication between
husband and wife," as well as any professional and the professional's patient or
client except that between attorney and client or clergy member and penitent"is abrogated and does not constitute grounds for failure to report." 92
IV. STATE LAW COMPARISONS
South Carolina is one of the few states that has a distinct homicide by child
abuse statute that separates child homicides from adult homicides. 93 This Part
compares South Carolina's homicide by child abuse statute with the statutes in

86. Id. § 16-3-85(D). A child's crying does not constitute provocation under the statute and
thus should not be considered as a mitigating circumstance. Id.
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310 (Supp. 2013).
88. Id. §63-7-310(A). This section of the Code includes a list of professionals in the
medical, religious, education, and law enforcement fields, all of whom are required to report under
the Statute. Id.
89. Id. § 63-7-3 10(C) (emphasis added).
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-410 (2010).
91. Id. §63-7-420.
92. Id.
93. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (2003). Delaware, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia
also have distinct statutes. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633-34 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-208 (LexisNexis 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE § 618D-2a (LexisNexis 2010). Some other states do not distinguish homicide by child abuse from other
forms of homicide. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (Supp. 2014) (failing to distinguish between
various types of murder under the statute). Finally, others include child abuse within their murder
statutes. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (2004) (including a provision in the degrees of
murder statute for murder of a child under twelve years of age).
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Delaware, Utah, and Washington-all of which have similar statutory
frameworks but have had lower rates of fatalities for the past several years 94-to
determine if the structure or language of any of those statutes might improve
South Carolina's laws.
A.

Delaware

The main difference between the Delaware statutes and the South Carolina
statute is that Delaware separates murder by abuse or neglect into degrees based
on the mental culpability of the perpetrator. 95 Under Delaware's framework,
A person is guilty of murder by abuse or neglect in the first degree
when the person recklessly causes the death of a child: (1) through an
act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or (2) when the person has
engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect of such child.96
However, Delaware law also provides the following:
A person is guilty of murder by abuse or neglect in the second
degree when, with criminal negligence, the person causes the death of a
child: (1) through an act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or (2)
when the person has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or
neglect of such child.9
In Delaware, a person convicted of first-degree murder by abuse or neglect
may be punished by death or by life imprisonment without the possibility of
probation, parole, or any other reduction; 98 on the other hand, the maximum
sentence for a person convicted of second-degree murder by abuse or neglect is
twenty-five years, 99 with a minimum sentence of ten years. 100 Thus, Delaware
finds a perpetrator who acted with recklessness more culpable than one who
acted with negligence and imposes sentences accordingly. 10 Both statutes cover

94. See sources cited supra note 32 (noting that, between 2003 and 2012, South Carolina had
a higher annual rate of fatalities than Delaware, Utah, and Washington).
95. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633-634 (2007) (classifying murder by child abuse
as either first or second degree murder), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(C)(1) (2003) (treating all
homicide by child abuse charges the same).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 634(a).
97. Id. § 633(a).
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(a) (Supp. 2013).
99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(2) (2007). Second-degree murder by abuse is a class
B felony under Delaware law. Id. § 633(d).
100. Id. § 633(d).
101. See supra notes 98- 100 and accompanying text.
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children up to age thirteenl02 and include a past pattern of abuse as a potential
element of the crime.103
The benefit of separating murder by child abuse or neglect into two degrees
is that it offers a more comprehensive approach and covers more instances of
fatal child abuse 04 both reckless murder and negligent murder. 0 5 Practically,
the separate statutes give prosecutors a tool to either argue that a perpetrator
acted recklessly and deserves a higher punishment, or that a perpetrator acted
negligently and deserves a lower punishment.106 Thus, the Delaware statutes
effectively cover two degrees of fatal injuries inflicted upon children and impose
penalties for each offense that the state deems appropriate and proportional.107
Moreover, the Delaware statutes cover children under the age of fourteen, 0 8
therefore including three more years than South Carolina's statute, which only
covers children under the age of eleven.1 09
Delaware's reporting statute provides that any "person who knows or in
good faith suspects child abuse or neglect shall make a report I .

"

An oral

report must be made immediately by telephone or otherwise.
Anyone who
fails to report under the statute "is liable for a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000
for the first violation, and not to exceed $50,000 for any subsequent
violation."ll2 Privileged communication, other than between attorney and client
or priest and penitent, is not recognized."13

102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633(b)(2), 634(b)(2).
103. See id. §§ 633(a)(2), 634(a)(2). Under both statutes, a previous pattern of abuse or
neglect means two or more incidents of conduct that constitute abuse, neglect, or both and that are
not so closely related to each other or connected in time and place to constitute a single event.
Id. §§ 633(b)(3), 634(b)(3).
104. See Phipps, supra note 13, at 593 (concluding that the best approach, when feasible, "is
to consider the range of fatal injuries inflicted upon children and draft comprehensive statutes that
adopt penalties appropriate to the various offenses").
105. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633-634.
106. See supra notes 98- 100 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 98- 100 and accompanying text.
108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633(b)(2), 634(b)(2).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003).
111. Id. § 904.
112. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §914 (Supp. 2012).
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
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Utah1 14

Utah's child abuse homicide statute, section 76-5-208, applies if the
circumstances do not amount to aggravated murder under section 76-5-202.1 15
Similar to Delaware's statutes,11 6 Utah's statute separates the levels of mental
culpability."
Under the statute, "[c]riminal homicide constitutes child abuse
homicide if, under circumstances not amounting to aggravated murder ... the
actor causes the death of a person under 18 years of age and the death results
from child abuse . ...

Section 76-5-109, which is referenced in the statute,

further divides child abuse into two separate offenses: infliction of serious
physical injury upon a child and infliction of physical injury upon a child." 9 If
the death results from serious physical injury inflicted recklessly, the perpetrator
is guilty of a first-degree felony, 20 but if the death results from serious physical
injury inflicted negligently, the perpetrator is guilty of a second-degree felony.121
Further, if the death results from physical injury inflicted intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, the perpetrator is guilty of a second-degree
felony.122 Thus, to an even greater extent than Delaware, Utah distinguishes
between different levels of offenses and apportions punishment accordingly.123
Notably, the Utah statute covers all children under eighteen,124 which is more
expansive than the statutory frameworks in both Delawarel25 and South
Carolina. 126
Utah's reporting statute provides that any person "who has reason to believe
that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect or who witnesses a child being

114. Utah has three different statutes that address fatal child abuse and neglect. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) ("Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another" and the "homicide was
committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor
committed or attempted to commit . . .child abuse.. .. "); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(d)
(LexisNexis 2012) ("Criminal homicide constitutes murder if. . the actor is engaged in the
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted
commission of any predicate offense [including child abuse], or is a party to the predicate
offense . . . ."); id. § 76-5-208 (stating the law for child abuse homicide). For the purposes of this
Note, only section 76-5-208 will be discussed.
115. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208 (LexisNexis 2012).
116. See supra notes 96 97 and accompanying text.
117. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208(1).
118. Id. Section 76-5-208(1) then proceeds to enumerate the various mens rea. See id.
119. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-109(2)-(3).(LexisNexis 2012). Section 76-5-109(2)
refers to child abuse that results in serious physical injury, whereas section 76-5-109(3) refers to
child abuse that results in physical injury. See id.
120. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208(2).
121. Id. § 76-5-208(3).
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 98-101, 117-22 and accompanying text.
124. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208(1).
125. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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subjected to conditions that reasonably may result in abuse or neglect" must
immediately notify the proper authorities.127 Further, Utah has a specific statute
providing "that any person who has reason to believe that a child has died as a
result of abuse" must immediately notify authorities.128 Any person who fails to
report under these statutes is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 29 and may be
*130
* *
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.
Privileged
communication, other than between clergyman or priest and penitent, is not
recognized. 131
C. Washington
Washington's homicide by abuse statutel32 is the most similar to South
Carolina's statutory framework.133 Washington, unlike Delawarel34 and Utah,135
does not distinguish between different offenses or levels of mental culpability;
rather, the statute provides that a person is guilty of homicide by abuse if,
[U]nder circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human
life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years
of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the
person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or
torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally
disabled person, or dependent person.136
Thus, Washington utilizes the same mental culpability "manifesting an
extreme indifference to human life" 37-as South Carolina.138 Homicide by
abuse in Washington is a class A felony,139 punishable-at a maximum with
life imprisonment.140 Notably, the coverage of Washington's statute is more
expansive than the statutes in Delaware,141 Utah,142 and South Carolinal43
because it covers all children under sixteen years of age, as well as

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-405 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-411 (LexisNexis 2011).
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-204(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(2) (LexisNexis 2011).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055 (West 2009).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (2003).
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117 22 and accompanying text.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055(1).
Id.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055(3).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013).
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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developmentally disabled persons and dependent adults.144
Washington's
statute, however, is more restrictive than the Utahl45 and South Carolinal46
statutes because it requires a prior pattern of abuse.147
Washington's reporting statute is also the most similar to South
Carolina's,148 in that it provides a list of professionals who are required to report
known or suspected abuse but does not impose a mandatory requirement on all
persons.149 Under the statute, an oral report must be made immediately, by
telephone or otherwise, to the proper law enforcement agency or social services
department.150 Washington's statute provides that communications between
physician or surgeon and patient, in addition to those between attorney and client
and priest and member of the clergy, are privileged.151
D. BeneficialAspects ofSouth Carolina'sStatute, Comparatively
The examination of states that have statutes similar to South Carolina's
homicide by child abuse statute demonstrates that South Carolina's statute has
several beneficial aspects. For instance, Washington's statute employs narrower
language than South Carolina's by requiring proof of multiple prior incidents of
abuse.
While such language effectively targets offenders who have a pattern
of past violent behavior, it precludes prosecution of a one-time violent act that
results in death such as violent shaking or suffocation of a child under
circumstances in which no evidence of prior injuries exists.153 Likewise, West
Virginia's statute imposes the requirement that the actor be a parent or
caretaker,154 unlike South Carolina's statute, which is silent on the identity of the
abuser.
Although this requirement effectively addresses the majority of
offenders, it nonetheless precludes other guilty actors-such as a boyfriend or
girlfriend who takes care of the child for a temporary period of time.
Thus, by
not requiring proof of a past pattern of abuse, or that the abuser is the child's

144. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055(1) (West 2003).
145. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208(1) (LexisNexis 2012).
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A) (2003).
147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055(1).
148. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
149. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West Supp. 1013).
150. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.040 (West 2005).
151. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West Supp. 2013).
152. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055 (West 2009) ("A person is guilty of homicide by
abuse if . .. the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said
child, or person under sixteen years of age .
).
153. Phipps, supra note 13, at 592.
154. W. VA. CODE ANN § 61-8D-2a (LexisNexis 2010). This Note has not discussed West
Virginia's statute in depth because West Virginia's rates of fatal child abuse were higher than South
Carolina's rates for the past several years. See sources cited supra note 32.
155. See S.C. CODE ANN. §16-3-85 (2003).
156. Phipps, supra note 13, at 592.
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parent or custodian, the broad language of South Carolina's statute covers a
larger range of child abuse fatalities.
Notwithstanding, the prominence of fatal child abuse in South Carolina
suggests that the homicide by child abuse statute and the accompanying
mandatory reporting statute have not had the positive impact on lowering fatality
cases or the deterrent effect on offenders one would hope that statutes dealing
with the death of children would have. Thus, South Carolina should consider
reforming the homicide by child abuse laws in accordance with the beneficial
aspects of the Delaware, Utah, and Washington statutes.
V.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S STATUTES AND PUBLIC

POLICY

Rather than allow law and policy to remain stagnant in the midst of a severe,
ongoing problem,159 South Carolina should reform the current law to embrace a
more comprehensive approach, create stricter mandatory reporting rules, and
focus on improving state child protection services. This Part discusses these
general recommendations in greater depth.
A.

Proposed Changes to the Homicide by ChildAbuse Statute

Several changes should be made to the current statute to clarify the scope of
the law, heighten its deterrent effect, and cover more incidents of fatal child
abuse or neglect. 160 First, the South Carolina General Assembly should amend
the statute to increase the age of coverage under the law. 161 Currently, proposed
legislation before the General Assembly would increase the age of coverage
from the existing age range, eleven and under, to a more inclusive age range of
eighteen and under. 62 The South Carolina General Assembly should adopt this
amendment because, even though infants and toddlers are the most vulnerable to
abuse,163 instances of child abuse and neglect involving children older than

157. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85.
158. See supra notes 4-6, 8 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Severson, supra note 31, at A14 (stating that South Carolina implemented a
legislative audit of its state Department of Social Services, specifically the child protective division,
after numerous reports of child starvation, improper medical attention, and at least one report of a
child being put back into a home at which the child experienced more sexual abuse).
160. Numerous bills currently pending in the South Carolina General Assembly would
accomplish these goals. See H.R. 3024, 120th Leg. 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013); H.R. 3250, 120th Leg.,
1st Sess. (S.C. 2013); H.R. 3073, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013); H.R. 3371, 120th Leg., 1st Sess.
(S.C. 2013).
161. See H.R. 3250, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013) (increasing the age of coverage from
eleven to eighteen).
162. Id.
163. U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 20, at 1.
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twelve do occur, especially within families. 164 An increased age of coverage is
justified not only to account for these situationsl65 and to increase the sco e of
the coverage of the homicide law to reach a broader range of fatalities,
but
also to ensure that a child older than eleven is not afforded less protection than a
child under eleven.167 The Delaware, Utah, and Washington statutes all provide
protections for children within a larger age range than South Carolina's
statute,168 and Utah's statute specifically covers children up to eighteen. 169
Additionally, an increased age of coverage is consistent with the South
Carolina Children's Code, in which a child is defined as a person under the age
of eighteen.17 0 Although the homicide statute falls under a different title 1 than
the Children's Code,172 there is no logical reason for the Children's Codewhich includes the statutes governing the reporting of abuse and neglect 73-to
define child as a person under the age of eighteen, while the specific homicide by
child abuse statute protects only children under eleven years of age.174 As
currently written, a child between the ages of twelve and eighteen is protected
under the Children's Code but not under the homicide by abuse statute. 1 5 The
General Assembly, however, neglected to provide a rationale for this distinction.

164. See Phipps, supra note 13, at 580 n.194; see also EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND,
supra note 7, at 3 (finding that six percent of child abuse and neglect fatality victims in 2010 were
between the ages of twelve and seventeen (citing CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010, supra note 32, at
59)).
165. See EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 3 (citing CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2010, at 59).

166. See H.R. 3250, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013) (increasing the age of coverage from
eleven to eighteen).
167. See Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 12, at 427.
168. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 634 (2007) (stating that a person is guilty of murder
by abuse or neglect when the victim is under fourteen years of age), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5208(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (stating that child abuse homicide occurs when an actor causes the death
of a person under eighteen years of age), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055 (West 2009)
(finding a person guilty of homicide by abuse if the child is under sixteen years of age), with S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003) (stating that a person is guilty of homicide by child abuse if the
victim is under the age of eleven).
169. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-208(1) (LexisNexis 2012).
170. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-1-40(1), 63-7-20(3) (2010); see also Liang & Macfarlane, supra
note 12, at 427 (noting that the South Carolina Code defines a child as a person under the age of
eighteen, while the child abuse statute applies only to children under the age of eleven). The
Children's Code governs areas including, but not limited to, adoption, foster care, child support,
child protection, and juvenile justice. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-10, 63-7-2310, 63-9-10, 63-17310, 63-19-10 (2010).
171. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (2003).
172. Id. §63-1-10 (2010).
173. See id.§§ 63-7-310 through -450 (2010 & Supp. 2013).
174. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-1-40(1), 63-7-20(3) (2010) (defining a child as a person
under eighteen), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003) (stating that a person is guilty of
homicide by child abuse if the victim is under the age of eleven).
175. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-1-40(1), 63-7-20(3) (2010) (defining a child as a person
under eighteen), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003) (stating that a person is guilty of
homicide by child abuse if the victim is under the age of eleven).
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Thus, the age protection under the homicide statute should be changed to reflect
the inclusiveness of the age protection under the Children's Code.
Second, the South Carolina General Assembly should amend section 16-385(A)(1) 177 to increase the penalty for committing homicide by child abuse as a
principal actor to life without parole, similar to the Delaware statute's penalty for
first-degree murder by abuse. 17
The proposed legislation would raise the
penalty from the existing sentence range, twenty years to life, to life without the
possibility of parole or even death.179 The South Carolina General Assembly
should adopt this legislation because increasing the penalty will serve as a
greater deterrent and will accomplish two other purposes: (1) ensuring that the
punishment for killing a child is as severe as the punishment for killing an
adult180 and (2) lowering the risk of repeat offenders.181 Although life without
parole is an extreme penalty,182 such severity is warranted in cases in which the
offender, as required by the statute, acted with extreme indifference to human
life. 183

176. See H.R. 3250, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-1-40(1), 63-720(3) (2010).
177. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003) (providing that "[a] person is guilty of
homicide by child abuse if the person causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while
committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to human life"); id. § 16-3-85(C)(1) (providing that a conviction of homicide
by child abuse is a felony punishable by life in prison).
178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 634(a)(1)-(2) (2007) (stating when a person is guilty
of murder by abuse or neglect); id. tit. 11, § 4209(a) (a person convicted of first-degree murder by
abuse or neglect may be punished by death or by life imprisonment without the possibility of
probation, parole, or any other reduction).
179. See H.R. 3073, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013). The amendment may be referred to as
"Brianna's Law," in memory of Brianna Bright, a five-month-old who died from blunt force head
trauma committed by her father. See id.; Andrew Moore, Child Abuse Bill Gaining Support, THE
JOURNAL (Jan. 7, 2010), http://archive.upstatetoday.com/?p=58244.
180. Compare H.R. 3073, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013) (increasing the penalty for
homicide by child abuse to life without parole or death), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (2003
& Supp. 2013) ("A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by
death, by imprisonment for life, or by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty
years.").
181. See, e.g., Will Jones, Two Homicide by Child Abuse Cases Head to GrandJury, Fox
CAROLINA NEWS (Aug. 2, 2011, 12:34 PM), http://www.foxcarolina.com/story/15194350/twohomicide-by-child-abuse-cases-head-t. Daron Davis, convicted of homicide by child abuse in 1995
for the death of his eleven-month-old daughter, was sentenced to twenty years in prison, but only
served half that time. Id. After early release, he was charged with killing his five-month-old
daughter. Id.
182. See Julian H. Wright, Jr., Life- Without-Parole:An Alternative to Death or Not Much ofa
Life at All?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529, 567 (1990) (stating that life without parole is a "hard
sanction").
183. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003). Under South Carolina law, "extreme
indifference is a mental state akin to intent characterized by a deliberate act culminating in death."
State v. Jarrell, 350 S.C. 90, 98, 564 S.E.2d 362, 367 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus, the accidental death of
a child would not subject a person to life without parole or death. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-385(A)(1), (C)(1)-(2) (2003).
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Likewise, the General Assembly should amend section 16-3-85(A)(2) 184 to
increase the penalty of committing the crime as an aider and abettor in
accordance with the penalty for a principal under section 16-3-85(A)(1).1 8 5 To
aid and abet the crime of child abuse, one has to have helped, assisted, or
facilitated the commission of the crime; promoted the accomplishment of the
abuse; helped in advancing or bringing the abuse about; or encouraged,
counseled, or incited the commission of the abuse. 186 In light of the proposed
legislation that would increase the penalty for a principal actor under section 163-85(A)(1), 1s7 the General Assembly must consider increasing the current
penalty for an aider and abettor under section 16-3-85(A)(2) from ten to twenty
years to a higher sentence as well. Under South Carolina law, a person who
aids in the commission of a felony is subject to the same punishment as the
principal felon. 189 The 1993 amendment to section 16-1-40 which amended
several other statutes as well provides a general rationale for the statutes that
govern the sentencing of a person convicted of a crime, namely to prescribe
sanctions that, inter alia, "assure just punishment that is commensurate with the
seriousness of the criminal conduct,

. .

. deter criminal conduct[, and] provide for

punishment that is necessary to hold the offender accountable for the crime and
promote respect for the law."1 90
Punishing an aider to the same extent as the principal is consistent with these
general rationales.191 First, crimes against children are arguably some of the
most serious crimes that one can commit, and the punishment for such crimes

184. Id. § 16-3-85(A)(2) ("A person is guilty of homicide by child abuse if the
person ... knowingly aids and abets another person to commit child abuse or neglect, and the child
abuse or neglect results in the death of a child under the age of eleven.").
185. Id. § 16-3-85(C)(1).
186. State v. Smith, 359 S.C. 481, 491, 597 S.E.2d 888, 894 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (6th ed. 1990)). In Smith, sufficient evidence was found to support
a conviction for aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse. Id. at 492, 597 S.E.2d at 894. The
victim sustained injuries, which were a result of severe beating with intentional force to the back of
the victim's head, during a time frame when the codefendants the victim's mother and the
mother's boyfriend were the only adults with the victim. Id. at 487-88, 597 S.E.2d at 891-92.
The codefendants admitted to investigators that they were never separated from each other or the
victim during the time when her injuries occurred. Id. at 484, 597 S.E.2d at 890. Thus, because the
codefendants were the only two people who could have caused the injuries, the jury found each
defendant guilty of homicide by child abuse and aiding and abetting. See id. at 488, 597 S.E.2d at
892. But see State v. Lewis, 403 S.C. 345, 356-57, 743 S.E.2d 124, 130 (Ct. App. 2013) (reversing
the aiding and abetting conviction of the codefendant boyfriend because he and the victim's mother
were in separate rooms during the incident and not within eyesight of each other, thus negating the
requisite elements that the boyfriend acted overtly and "knowingly" engaged in aiding and
abetting).
187. See H.R. 3073, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013).
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(C)(2) (2003).
189. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-40 (2003) ("A person who aids in the commission of a
felony ... is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be punished in the manner prescribed for
the punishment of the principal felon.").
190. 1993 S.C. Acts 3233.
19 1. See id.
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should reflect the degree of reprehensibility.192 Second, punishing an aider to the
same extent as the principal serves as strict deterrence because aiders may be less
likely to help the principal commit a crime if they can be punished as
principals. 193 Third, if an aider and abettor chooses to engage in the abuse,
rather than intervene or report the crime, the aider should derivatively incur the
principal's punishment because the aider's own actions contributed to the
principal's violation.194 Additionally, the principal and the aider and abettor
arguably are equally culpable.195 In some circumstances, the principal may not
have been able to accomplish the crime had the aider and abettor not assisted the
principal in the first place. 196 Further, because of the nature of child abuse, the
dependency and vulnerability of the victim, the ongoing pattern of abuse
escalating over time, and the inability of the victim to seek help,197 both the
principal and the aider and abettor play a significant role in ending an abused
child's life.198 Thus, the statutory penalties for the two crimes should reflect that
culpability, and one should not hold a lesser penalty than the other. 199
Nevertheless, the homicide by child abuse statute currently allows for a lesser
penalty for accomplices than for principals. 200 The General Assembly neglected
to provide a rationale for this distinction.201 Thus, the General Assembly must

192. See David W. Shaaf, What if the Victim is a Child? Examining the Constitutionalityof
Louisiana'sChallenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 378 (2000) ("Crimes against
young children are reprehensible and deserving of serious punishment.").
193. See Nancy A. Tanck, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability for Parents
Who Fail to Protect Their Childrenfrom Abuse, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 659, 684 (1987).
194. See Liang & MacFarlane, supra note 12, at 411.
195. See id. at 400.
196. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 359 S.C. 481, 486-88, 597 S.E.2d 888, 891 92 (Ct. App. 2004)
(illustrating a case in which an aider and abettor, the mother's boyfriend, provided a substantial
amount of assistance). In Smith, the victim sustained injuries during the time when the mother and
boyfriend were the only two people who could have caused injury. Id. at 488, 597 S.E.2d at 892.
The victim had two skull fractures that caused immediate neurological problems that would have
been obvious to the mother and boyfriend, and doctors concluded that the victim's injuries were a
result of severe beating with intentional force to the back of the victim's head. Id. at 487, 597
S.E.2d at 891. The boyfriend knew the victim had experienced projectile vomiting during this time,
but had not relayed that information to medical personnel, and the mother and boyfriend attempted
to cover up what had happened to the victim neither the mother nor the boyfriend told medical
personnel about the serious injury that was inflicted on the victim even though they both had the
opportunity to do so. Id. at 488, 597 S.E.2d at 892.
197. State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 27, 664 S.E.2d 480, 484-85 (2008) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
198. See Jean Peters-Baker, Punishing the Passive Parent: Ending a Cycle of Violence, 65
UMKC L. REV. 1003, 1023 (1997).
199. See Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 12, at 409 (stating that "there remains a need for a
statute that holds all parents adequately accountable for both acts and omissions resulting in the
death of their children by abuse").
200. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(C)(1) (2003) (providing that the principal may be
imprisoned for twenty years to life), with § 16-3-85(C)(2) (providing that that the aider and abettor
must be imprisoned for ten to twenty years); see also Liang & Macfarlane, supra note 12, at 425-26
(identifying this discrepancy).
201. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(C)(1) (2003) (providing that the principal may be
imprisoned for twenty years to life), with § 16-3-85(C)(2) (providing that that the aider and abettor
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change its approach namely by increasing the penalty under both section 16-385(A)(1) and 16-3-85(A)(2)-to provide consistency under current South
Carolina law.
Third, while the statute inherently criminalizes the specific infliction of
abuse, as well as the failure to protect a child from abuse that results in the death
of that child,202 the construction of the statute might not articulate this clearly
203
Thus, the General Assembly should add a
enough for a layman to understand.
separate "failure to act" section to the statute to make its language clearer, and to
ensure that South Carolinians understand the duties they have and the possible
culpability they will encounter if they fail to intervene. 20 This addition could be
placed in section 16-3-85(A) with the following language: "A person is guilty of
homicide by child abuse if the person: (3) fails to intervene when another person
causes the death of a child under the age of [eighteen] while committing child
abuse or neglect." This will clear up any discrepancies as to what perpetrators
can be charged with and will clarify what penalties a perpetrator will
encounter. 205
Additionally, a separate failure to act section is necessary because, as the
statute is currently written, a person who fails to protect a child from abuse may
be guilty as a principal under section 16-3-85(A),206 while a person who
knowingly aids and abets which requires an overt act 207is guilty only as an
accomplice under section 16-3-85(B) and is thus subject to less of a penalty.208
It exceeds logical reason to hold an aider and abettor who overtly acts less
culpable than a passive parent or witness who allows the abuse to occur. Thus,
the statute should clarify that a person will be held responsible for committing
the act, aiding or abetting the act, and failing to intervene with the act, and all

must be imprisoned for ten to twenty years without indicating why that penalty is less than the
penalty for the principal).
202. State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 27, 664 S.E.2d 480, 485 (2008) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
203. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)-(B) (2003). One has to put different pieces of the
statute together to come to the realization that a failure to act also results in culpability. Id.
Particularly, one has to connect (A)(1), which imposes liability on a principal actor for causing the
death while committing child abuse or neglect, to (B)(1), which defines child abuse or neglect as an
act or omission that causes harm to the child's physical health or welfare, to (B)(2), which defines
harm as occurring when one inflicts physical injury upon the child or allows such physical injury to
be inflicted. Id.
204. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(C) (West 2002) (making no distinction between
those who act and those who fail to act in homicide by child abuse, and charging both with firstdegree murder).
205. See, e.g., id. (charging the principal and aider with first-degree murder for homicide by
child abuse).
206. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1), (B)(1), (C)(1) (2003).
207. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 403 S.C. 345, 354, 743 S.E.2d 124, 128 (2013) ("Under
accomplice liability theory, a person must personally commit the crime or be present at the scene of
the crime and intentionally, or through a common design, aid, abet, or assist the commission of that
crime through some overt act." (quoting State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584
(2010))).
208. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(2), (C)(2) (2003).
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three crimes should subject the offender to the same penalty. This way, South
Carolina can demonstrate to potential offenders that it will not tolerate the
infliction of abuse, the assistance of such abuse, or the ignoring of such abuse,
and that a person who engages in any of these will be held equally
accountable. 209
Finally, the General Assembly should amend the statute to include a
negligence offense. One of the benefits of South Carolina's statute is that it
eliminates the need for a prosecutor to show intent to kill; rather, the prosecutor
must show that the perpetrator acted with extreme indifference to human life. 210
Because extreme indifference to human ife is defined as "a mental state akin to
intent characterized by a deliberate act culminating in death,"211 the statute
effectively covers violent acts of aggression by an adult against a child without
requiring proof of malice aforethought-particularly with respect to
212
The statute, however, does not
premeditation or deliberation of the death.
currently account for acts of negligence.2 13
This gap in the law is illustrated by the South Carolina Supreme Court's
reversal of a single mother's conviction in 2013.214 In 2008, a single mother of
three was convicted by a jury of homicide by child abuse for the death of her
fifteen-month-old son, who died from an overdose of prescription medicine; she
An autopsy of her son
was sentenced to thirty-five years of imprisonment.2
revealed that he had six times the prescribed amount of the drug hydroxyzinewhich was prescribed to him for his eczema-in his body at the time of death.
Although the mother's conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals,217 the
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the State failed to
introduce direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that she acted with
extreme indifference to human life.218 Particularly, the court stated that the State
did not submit sufficient evidence to prove that the mother consciously engaged

209. This is in line with Chief Justice Toal's explanation of the public policy upon which the
statute is grounded that "an adult is not only prohibited from physically abusing a child, but also is
prohibited from deliberately sitting by and allowing a child's life to be threatened by the abuse of
another." State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 27-28, 664 S.E.2d 480, 485 (2008) (Toal, C.J., dissenting);
see also Barron, supra note 31 (providing an example of a situation that recently occurred in South
Carolina in which a mother came home to her child being abused, but ignored it and took a shower
instead of intervening, while the abuse continued and escalated to the child's death).
210. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A)(1) (2003).
211. State v. Jarrell, 350 S.C. 90, 98, 564 S.E.2d 362, 367 (Ct. App. 2002).
212. See Phipps, supra note 13, at 591.
213. See McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 48, 661 S.E.2d 354, 361 (2008) (noting that extreme
indifference does not encompass negligence).
214. See State v. Avery, No. 2013-MO-016 (S.C. June 12, 2013).
215. Id.
216. Sarita Chourey, High Court to Hear Beaufort Toddler Death Suit, BLUFFTON TODAY
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.blufftontoday.com/bluffton-news/2013-04-10/high-court-hear-beauforttoddler-death-suit#.Unql SvF24c.
217. Avery, No. 2013-MO-016.
218. Id.
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in a life-threatening act with indifference as to whether her son lived or died.219
The court noted that the State's sole evidence of the mother's mental stateother than that "it is common knowledge that death may occur from improper
dosage" was the medicine bottle label indicating that one-half teaspoon of the
medicine "should be taken by mouth every six hours as needed." 220 According
to the court, this "[did] not amount to substantial circumstantial evidence from
which a jury could conclude [the mother] acted without care as to whether [her
son] lived or died so as to manifest extreme indifference to human life."221 As a
result, her conviction was reversed.222
While the circumstances of that case clearly warrant sympathy,223 the law
must be objective when holding people accountable for their actions.224 In this
instance, a young child died as a result of his mother's act.225 Thus, if the
prosecution arguably could have more effectively sought a negligence claim than
an extreme indifference claim, then the statute should have provided the means
to do so. The advantage of the Delaware and Utah statutes is that they recognize
that not all homicides carry the same degree of culpability.226 South Carolina
should restructure its statute to similarly account for both degrees of
culpability extreme indifference and negligence. This additional offense could
be included after sections 16-3-85A(1) and 16-3-85(2), as well as the proposed
subsection (3),227 and would have a lesser penalty than inflicting, aiding, or
ignoring physical abuse with extreme indifference.
B. ProposedChanges to the Mandatory ReportingStatute
The homicide by child abuse statute should also be supplemented by
stronger mandatory reporting requirements.229 Either one or both parents are the

219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. See People v. Herskowitz, 364 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 (1975), aff'd, 382 N.Y.S.2d 293 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 364 N.E.2d 1127 (N.Y. 1977) ("Justice under the law must be objective and
impersonal.") (citing People v. Feliciano, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126 (1958)).
225. See Avery, No. 2013-MO-016.
226. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 633(a)(1)-(2), 634(a)(1)-(2) (2007) (differentiating
between murder by abuse or neglect in the first degree and second degree); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-208 (LexisNexis 2012) (distinguishing between child abuse homicide in the first degree and
second degree).
227. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (2003).
228. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 633(a), (d) (2007) (stating that when a person is
guilty of murder by abuse or neglect in the second degree with criminal negligence, the minimum
penalty is ten years), with id. tit. 11, §§ 634(a), 4209(a) (2007) (mandating the punishment for a
conviction of murder by abuse or neglect in the first degree as death or life without parole).
229. See H.R. 3024, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013) (proposing to require any person, not
just the listed professionals, to report suspected child abuse or neglect).
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perpetrators in the majority of fatal child abuse and neglect cases;230 thus, the
people who are responsible for the proper care of their child and in the best
position to protect their child have often failed in their duties.231 The victims of
child abuse and neglect are also unique in that they are also "often unwilling, or
unable, to report the crimes being committed against them." 232 Thus, if other
people who know or suspect that a child is being abused or neglected do not
report their knowledge or suspicion to state authorities, the child essentially
*233
receives no help in escaping the situation.
South Carolina's General Assembly should take four steps to remedy this
problem. First, in accordance with the legislative trend in the United States,234
the General Assembly should amend the mandatory reporting statute to expand
the category of people who are required to report.235 Both the Delaware and
Utah statutes take this approach.
Currently, proposed legislation would
require any person in South Carolina not just the listed professionals-to report
suspected child abuse or neglect.237 The General Assembly should adopt this
amendment because anyone who witnesses or suspects child abuse, not just
professionals, should be required to report it. Oftentimes, people who are in a
close relationship with the abuser-such as friends, neighbors, or relativesknow that the abuse is occurring because they witness it or suspect that the abuse
is occurring because they recognize the indicators. 23 Thus, these people may
provide a victim the only shot at getting help;239 requiring them to report, and

230. See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 32, at 59. In 2011, four-fifths (78.3%) of
child abuse and neglect fatalities were caused by one or more of the child's parents. Id.
23 1. See id.
232. THOMSON REUTERS, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: MANDATORY CHILD ABUSE
REPORTING 1 (2013).

233. See Brian G. Fraser, A Glance at the Past, a Gaze at the Present, a Glimpse at the
Future:A CriticalAnalysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 641, 665 (1978).
234. See Nancy E. Stuart, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client
Confidentiality, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 243, 247 (1987) ("At least eighteen states have enacted
such all-encompassing legislation.").
235. See H.R. 3024, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013) (proposing to require any person, not
just the listed professionals, to report suspected child abuse or neglect).
236. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 2011).
237. See H.R. 3024, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013).
238. See Fraser, supra note 233, at 646; see also State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 21 22, 664
S.E.2d 480, 481-82 (2008) (involving a case in which a friend and coworker of the abuser
witnessed two events of potential child abuse, one when the young child was found in the attic
drenched with sweat, and the other when the young child was found handcuffed by his feet to a
bed).
239. See Fraser, supra note 233, at 658 (stating that these people have the opportunity to
identify child abuse before it becomes too severe because they have daily contact with the child);
see also Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 27, 664 S.E.2d at 485 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) ("Child victims are
often completely dependent upon the abuser, unable to defend themselves, and often too young to
alert anyone to their horrendous plight or ask for help.").
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penalizing them if they fail to do so, may encourage all people who have a
chance to help to do so.240
Further, the amendment should be adopted because, under current South
Carolina law, non-offending parents are not required to report.241 Not including
parents as mandatory reporters fails to hold them accountable for the high duty
of care that they owe to their children.242 Additionally, not requiring parents to
report permits those who are in the best position to see and prevent abuse to
remain silent.243 Thus, requiring any person or everyone to report accomplishes
two purposes: (1) it ensures that any citizen who knows or reasonably suspects
that abuse is occurring has a duty to report and (2) it inherently includes parents,
thus reflecting the idea that parents have a heightened duty to protect their
children. 244
Second, the South Carolina General Assembly should amend the mandatory
reporting statute to include a time period in which reports must be made after
receipt of information giving someone reason to believe that a child has been or
may be abused or neglected. Currently, proposed legislation would require a
person to report within twenty-four hours or during the next working day.
The
General Assembly should adopt this legislation in South Carolina because child
abuse and neglect situations are ones in which urgency is critical. 246 When it

240. Under the current framework, "Generally, a person has no duty to act to stop a crime."
Rainey & Greer, supra note 11, at 17. This principle, however, fails to adequately address
situations in which children, who are naturally weaker and susceptible to their abuser, are in danger.
Id. When someone suspects or knows of the abuse and fails to prevent it by reporting, the child
victim is "left with no effective means of securing help." Id. Therefore, an exception to the "no
duty to stop a crime" principle does not seem unreasonable in this context, and expanding the
category of people who must report may encourage those who have the opportunity to help to do so,
thus lowering rates of death. See Fraser, supra note 233, at 665 (stating that "the person who
chooses not to report, personally assures the child's future" harm.). Moreover, in contrast to various
other crimes, there are mandatory reporting requirements for child abuse already. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-7-310 (2010 & Supp. 2013).
241. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310(A) (2010 & Supp. 2013) (requiring that
certain professionals report known or suspected abuse or neglect, but not imposing such a
requirement on parents).
242. Suzanne M. Nicholls, Note, Responding to the Cries of the Innocent: Holding Nonoffending ParentsCriminally Responsiblefor Failing to Protect the Abused Child, 30 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV. 309, 328 (2007) (citing State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 150, 152 (Wis. 1986)).
243. Id. at 330 (citing Jessica Ann Toth Johns, Comment, Mandated Voices for the
Vulnerable: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Missouri's Mandatory Child Abuse
Reporting Statute, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2004)).
244. See id. (citing Johns, supra note 243).
245. See H.R. 3371, 120th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2013).
246. The Delaware, Utah, and Washington statutes all recognize this time sensitivity by
requiring that a report be made immediately. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 904 (2003 & Supp.
2012) (requiring an immediate oral report); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403(1)(a) (LexisNexis
2011) (requiring immediate notification); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.040 (West 2005)
(requiring an immediate oral report). Although the Delaware and Utah statutes do not specifically
define immediately, Washington's statute stipulates that immediately means that "[t]he report must
be made at the first opportunity, but in no case longer than forty-eight hours after there is reasonable
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comes to child abuse fatalities, "the abusive conduct is not usually confined to a
single instance, but rather is a systematic pattern of violence progressively
escalating and worsening over time." 247 Oftentimes, the abuse may begin with a
single strike to the child, but then moves to striking the child more frequently
and leaving a bruise, and then to breaking a bone, continuing to escalate until the
child is ultimately killed.248 Thus, requiring a short period for mandatory
reporting gives authorities the chance to intervene before the abuse or neglect
escalates to death.
Third, the South Carolina General Assembly should amend the mandatory
reporting statute to increase the penalty for failing to report. The current
monetary penalty, a maximum fine of $500,249 is not nearly as severe as
Delaware's penalty, which imposes a maximum fine of $10,000 for the first
violation and a maximum fine of $50,000 for subsequent violations.250 The
inclusion of penalty provisions in child protection statutes may, of course, have
possible drawbacks-for instance, the fear of possible liability might result in
over-reporting or reporting of unsubstantiated cases, which might burden the
state's investigative services and take away resources from the detection of
actual maltreatment.251 However, the primary purpose of mandated reporting
systems is to create a "reliable means to identify and investigate possible child
maltreatment," not to be "the absolute in risk assessment."25
The grave
consequences that may result from a failure to report certainly outweigh the
possibility of over-reporting,253 and increased penalty provisions are simply
another way to encourage those who can help a suffering child to do so. Indeed,
penalty provisions may decrease resistance to filing reports when it is justified
under the circumstances.254 Professionals who are required to report such as
doctors or teachers-may have a close relationship with the child's family, and
even the child's abuser, and thus will feel less like "traitors if, because of

cause to believe that the child has suffered abuse or neglect." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.030(1)(g) (West Supp. 2013).
247. State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 27, 664 S.E.2d 480, 484-85 (2008) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
248. Keli Goff, Could a Child Abuse Registry have Saved Adrian Peterson's Son?, WASH.
POST SHE THE PEOPLE BLOG (Oct. 15, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/shethe-people/wp/2013/10/15/could-a-child-abuse-registry-have- saved-adrian-petersons- son/ (quoting
Teresa Huizar, Exec. Dir. of the Nat'l Children's Alliance).
249. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-410 (2010). The penalty can also be a maximum of six months
imprisonment or both the monetary fine and imprisonment. Id.
250. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 914 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
251. Majorie R. Freiman, Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State
ChildAbuse Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 262 (1982) (citing G. GERBNER ET. AL., CHILD
ABUSE: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 143, 145 (1980)).
252. Starla J. Williams, Reforming MandatedReporting Laws After Sandusky, 22 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 235, 265 (2013) (citing Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering
ChildAbuse and Society's Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 851 (2010)).
253. Id. (citing Hafemeister, supra note 252, at 829).
254. Freiman, supranote 251, at 262.
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liability for inaction, they have no choice but to report."255 Accordingly,
increasing the penalty for failing to report may result in people being more
inclined to report.
The fourth, and possibly most controversial, step that the South Carolina
General Assembly should take is to abrogate all confidential communications
under the reporting statute, rather than exclude attorney client256 and clergy
member penitent privileges.257 Underreporting of child abuse is a significant
problem because, inter alia, "despite the existence of mandatory reporting laws
in every state, many people, including attorneys, are either unwilling to report or
unaware of the procedures."258 The distinctive attribute of child abuse that it
involves an ongoing pattern of behavior that gets more severe as it continues-

255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 234, at 266 ("A statutory duty to report child abuse should be
imposed on attorneys."). It is important to distinguish the difference between requiring attorneys to
report ongoing abuse and abuse that has occurred in the past, the latter of which has more protection
under the rules of attorney client confidentiality. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 4 (1980). To clarify, an attorney would be required to report instances of ongoing or future
abuse. The ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b) and the South Carolina Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6(b) provide that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2011); RULE 413, SCACR, R. 1.6 (2010). Thus, "Attorneys should already view the crime of child
abuse as a future crime and reveal their clients' intentions under the future crime exception in the
ethical rules." Stuart, supra note 234, at 266. Because the duty to reveal such information is
discretionary, however, it is inevitable that some lawyers will not disclose the abuse. See id. To
eliminate this discretion, a statutory duty explicitly requiring attorneys to report child abuse and a
statute abrogating the attorney client privilege should be enacted. See id. However, the duty to
report should not also impose a duty to testify against clients; rather, attorneys should be required to
"reveal only as much as is necessary to protect child abuse victims." Id.
257. See Paul Winters, Comment, Whom Must the Clergy Protect? The Interests ofAt-Risk
Children in Conflict with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 187, 226 (2012)
("Abrogation of the clergy exemption from mandatory reporting laws will advance the interests of
at-risk children."). But see J. Michael Keel, Comment, Law and Religion Collide Again: The
Priest-PenitentPrivilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 713 (1998) ("A
child abuse reporting statute that abrogates all privileges, including the priest-penitent privilege,
runs afoul of the Free Exercise Clause .... ). South Carolina ranks as the sixth most religious state
in the nation. Frank Newport, Mississippi MaintainsHold as Most Religious U.S. State, GALLUP
POLITICS (Feb.
13,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160415/mississippi-maintains-holdreligious- state.aspx# 1. According to Silent Tears-a 2013 privately financed report based on
interviews with hundreds of people who work closely with abused children in South Carolinachurches frequently stand between victims of child abuse and help. Kim Severson, South Carolina
is Faultedon Child Services, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/07/10/us/south-carolina-is-faulted-on-child-services.html? r=1&. Specifically, the study
found that church communities in South Carolina were unlikely to report abuse particularly sex
abuse. Id. The study also found that church communities in South Carolina might, at times, even
cover up known abuse by urging victims to forgive their abusers instead of reporting them to proper
authorities. Id.
258. Stuart, supra note 234, at 244; see also Day, supra note 1, at 48 ("Originally intended to
protect living child victims from publicity, confidentiality laws have become a hindrance to
professionals who are working to save children.").
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warrants the abrogation of all confidential communications.259 Mandatory
reporting is not as effective if privilege applies to certain relationships, and
260
issues arise when some privileges are abrogated but others are retained.
Although both the privacy of the attorney client and clergy member penitent
communications are appropriately protected in other scenarios, the "heinous
nature of child abuse seriously undermines whatever benefits society receives
from protected disclosure."261 The state's interest in protecting at-risk children
from potentially fatal abuse should trump the state's interest in protecting
Additionally, abrogating all confidential
penitent or client abusers.262
communications logically follows from the adoption of an any person reporting
provision, which commits the entire community, without exceptions, to the
protection of helpless children.263 Thus, complete abrogation of privileged
communications reflects the view that protecting children from fatal abuse is a
compelling and overriding state interest,264 and it places equal responsibility on
anyone who suspects or knows of abuse.265
C. ProposedPolicy Recommendations
Strengthening criminal enforcement can only be meaningful if South
Carolina also strengthens community support and Department of Social Services
266
(DSS) monitoring.
In particular, expanding the category of people who are
required to report and implementing a period within which they must report will
not improve anything if DSS does not act on such reports.267 Recently, DSS has

259. See Stuart, supra note 234, at 246 (citing Fraser, supra note 233, at 657).
260. See generally Winters, supra note 257 (urging abrogation of the clergy reporting
exemption and promoting an "any person" reporting requirement); see also Stuart, supra note 234,
at 266 (comparing attorneys and other professionals and arguing that any distinction in reporting
requirements is unwarranted).
261. Winters, supra note 257, at 205.
262. Id. at 192.
263. See id. at 226.
264. See Stuart, supra note 234, at 264.
265. See Winters, supra note 257, at 223-24.
266. See, e.g., R. Darren Price, Neighbors ofSlain Pelion Infant: Mother Threatenedto Throw
Baby Against a Wall, THE STATE, Dec. 12, 2012, at Bi, available at http://www.thestate.com/
2012/12/15/2557134/neighbors-of-slain-pelion-infant.html
(providing an example of lacking
community support and a possible failure of DSS monitoring when a mother had openly talked over
a period of weeks about harming her infant child).
267. The South Carolina Supreme Court imposed a duty on DSS and its social workers to
investigate and intervene when a report of child abuse is made, ruling that a violation of that duty
may give rise to a private cause of action. Jensen v. Anderson Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C.
195, 198-99, 403 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1991). Nevertheless, several recent incidents reveal that DSS
failed in its duty to investigate and intervene when notified. See, e.g., John Monk, 'Demon'Parents
Get Life for Killing Boy, 4, THE STATE (May 29, 2014), at Al, available at http://www.thestate.
com/2014/05/28/3472668/prosecutor-dss-ignored-many-pleas.html
(noting that former DSS
Director Lillian Koller admitted that the agency failed to take action before a four-year-old boy died
from repeated physical abuse and starvation, even though the agency had received several
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been attacked for allegedly putting children in harm's way in an effort to lower
the number of cases it has to manage.268 In South Carolina, DSS has an
extremely high level of cases, and employees manage on average 1,001 cases
each the highest caseload in the country.269 Thus, some DSS employees have
reported that they are "encouraged to funnel at-risk children into the Voluntary
Case Management [(VCM)] program," which was originally intended for very
low-level cases and not for cases involving sexual abuse or domestic violence.2 70
The VCM employees are not prepared or trained to deal with such dangerous
cases, which puts the already at-risk children in an even more vulnerable
position.271 Further, DSS has been criticized for lowering its number of children
in foster care at the expense of either sending children back to abusive
environments or not accepting children who need protection in the first place.272
The circumstances surrounding these allegations against DSS, if true,273 are
simply unacceptable.
To reduce the state's child abuse fatality rates, South Carolina needs to
increase funding for child protection measures.274 Compared to other states,
South Carolina spends less on child protection services, spending only $14.72

complaints that he was being abused); Price, supra note 266 (discussing how the mother of a twomonth-old girl talked about hurting the child in the weeks before the infant was killed and how the
neighbors allegedly called DSS after hearing the threats, but claimed that no one from the agency
ever came to help).
268. See Barron, supra note 31; see also Prentiss Findlay, S.C. Rep. Horne Keeps Pressure on
DSS over Handling of ChildAbuse, Neglect Cases, POST & COURIER (Nov. 28, 2012, 12:14 AM),
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20121128/PC16/121129431 (noting that the chairman of the
Richland County Court Appointed Special Advocates, a volunteer guardian ad litem program, stated
that "[w]ithout ambiguity, child protective services in the state of South Carolina are horrific").
269. Barron, supra note 3 1. The national average is 280 cases per employee. Id.
270. Barron, supra note 34 (quoting former DSS Deputy Director Linda Martin and an
unnamed VCM service provider).
271. See id.
272. See Monk, supra note 267 (describing a case in which DSS, after receiving complaints,
placed a two-month-old boy in foster care, where he flourished, but then returned the boy to his
parents when he was three years old after they completed a DSS program, and the parents later
abused him to death); see also Barron, supra note 34 (describing three cases in which a child was
killed, despite the family having been reported to child protective services at DSS).
273. A Legislative Audit Council investigation is currently under way with a report of its
findings expected in 2014. Barron, supra note 31.
274. See Day, supra note 1, at 48 (stating that it is "impossible to make a true impact [on
reducing fatalities] without the necessary funding for child protective services"); see also Findlay,
supra note 268 (suggesting that all of the problems with South Carolina's DSS "[go] back to
money"). Admittedly, allocating more resources and funds to child protection measures will take
resources and funds away from other state initiatives. However, fewer state priorities are more
deserving than the protection of vulnerable children. In 2010, South Carolina had a lower ratio of
state and local expenditures on child welfare to federal expenditures than forty-four other states, as
well as Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico. See Kerry DeVooght et al., Federal,State, and Local
Spending to Address Child Abuse and Neglect in SFYs 2008 and 2010, fig.5, THE ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUNDATION, http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ChildTrends-2012_06_20
FR CaseyCWFinancing.pdf (showing that over sixty percent of child protection expenditures in
South Carolina were federal rather than state funds).
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per capita in 2009, when the highest-ranking state spent $181 per person.275 This
puts a strain on child services and results in a consistently high rate of abuse and
neglect cases.276 Further, "In states with little funding, social workers are
overburdened by high caseloads, low pay, and stressful work environments,
resulting in high turnover and poor organization at the agencies." 277 Thus,
allocating more funds to child protection services ensures that employees can
investigate all abuse and neglect reports-not just some because social workers
would have more manageable caseloads.278 Moreover, child protection agencies
would more likely be able to retain experienced staff members and invest heavily
in proper training, as well as provide timely abuse treatment and other victim
279
services.
Additionally, with increased funds, child protection agencies would be able
to provide training and support for others who might be "on the front lines"
when it comes to responding and reporting child abuse and neglect situations,
such as "education, law enforcement, and health professionals."2 80 Such
professionals may not be aware of their own obligations, or understand how to
report known or suspected abuse and neglect.281 Likewise, agencies could better
educate the population in general on the reporting process, the responsibilities
citizens may have under the statutes, and the consequences they may suffer if
they fail to comply.282
Strengthening the formal child protective services in the state might also
help South Carolina heighten the state focus on alleviating poverty, improving
education, and reducing teen pregnancies.283 The majority of fatal child abuse

275. Spencer, supra note 21.
276. See id.
277. Id. According to recent data from South Carolina's DSS, the agency mishandled
numerous cases involving allegations of child abuse and neglect throughout the state. Kirk Brown,
Reviews Show S.C. Social Services Agency Mishandled Cases, ANDERSON INDEP.-MAIL (May 31,
2014, 3:54 PM), http://www.independentmail.com/news/2014/may/31 /reviews- show- sc- social- serv
ices-agency-cases/. For example, a December 2013 review of the agency's own data revealed
problems-including lack of documentation and failure to conduct proper assessments-in eleven
of the fifteen cases in Anderson County. Id. The data also revealed policy violations in ninetyseven cases that agency employees deemed to be unfound allegations, including paperwork flaws,
missed deadlines, a lack of consultation among supervisors, and failure to contact medical
professionals and law enforcement agencies. Id. DSS completely overlooked at least one of these
complaints and conducted the other investigations poorly. Id.
278. EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 9.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 10.
281. Id.
282. For instance, to reach younger generations, an explanation of the reporting law and
procedures could be integrated into the educational curriculum perhaps during health classes. To
reach adults, pamphlets explaining the procedure could be sent out yearly in the mail or made
available year round at doctors' offices or grocery stores, rather than information only being offered
online, particularly since online information is not easily accessible to everyone.
283. Jon M. Garon, For the Benefit of the Infant: An Introduction to the Symposium to End

ChildAbuse, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) i, iv (2006).
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situations are a product of environments with low income, low education, and
high teen pregnancy or unstable family structures.284 With greater funding, child
protective services would be able to focus on promoting safe and stable families
by increasing the amount of substance abuse and mental health treatment
programs offered, as well as the amount of teen pregnancy prevention and
prenatal care programs.285 Likewise, caseworkers would be able to improve both
the quantity and quality of home visits to ensure that such programs are working
286
to keep children safe.
Through such initiatives, child protective services
would have the ability to provide support services and appropriate supervision to
young parents, and potentially abusive and neglectful parents, so that they can
learn how to cope with the stresses of parenthood and how to safely care for their
children.287
Further, child protective services could provide support and
supervision for children who have been abused, but fortunately survived, to help
them overcome the past abuse and refrain from later repeating the cycle of abuse
onto others.288
VI. CONCLUSION

Children constitute a unique class of citizens and deserve heightened
protection under state laws. While South Carolina is on the right track, positive
changes can be made to the homicide by child abuse statute, the corresponding
mandatory reporting statute, and public policy to better protect children from
fatal child abuse and neglect. By changing and clarifying South Carolina law, by
expanding the category of people required to report, and by heightening state
monitoring and the focus on major risk factors that lead to child abuse and
neglect fatalities, South Carolina will be better equipped to protect its children.
If the goal is to reduce fatal child abuse rates to zero percent, South Carolina still
has room for improvement.
Brigid Benincasa

284. See EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 12; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
supra note 57, at 1; CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 15, at 6.
285. See EVERY CHILD MATTERS EDUC. FUND, supra note 7, at 14.

286. See id.
287. See id. at 9.
288. See id. at 12 (explaining that adults who were abused as children often abuse children
themselves).
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